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MILENA STERIO*

deflned as "peoples"
principle,
back to post
decolonisation and has served as the theoretical
independence quests. In the more recent decades, however,
can
principle's applicability in the non-decolonisation
secessionist movements rely on the principle of self-determination to justify their independence
demands? Or, docs the principle of self-determination in the non-decolonisation paradigm
bestow a
to internal autonomy on secessionist entities, while
them to
oftheir mother States? This
non-decolonisation paradigm with a
This article will discuss how the
to
ofNagorno-Karabakh arc entitled to independence from Azerbaijan. This article
rnnr1:rn11,,that the principle of self-determination does not lead toward the conclusion that
can legally secede from
absent a
of secession
international law.
puuu1-a1 future.

Armenia,

I. Introduction
... the fact remains that claims for self-determination do not disappear, but continue to
...,,,...,,,,...,,,...,...,and, as viewed over a longer span
may eventually lead to a re-
ofthe states,
ofthe
of such claims. 1

' Professor of Law and Associate Dean, Cleveland-Marshall
and
Minorities, in: Christian
tion and Secession in International I.aw
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to the

groups

to
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notion

to

ofWorld War I and
their future political

become capable of

Self-determination served as the driving ideology behind the decolonisation
movement post World War
coloniser

allowing colonised

right to

of
2

through

creation of their own independent States. Post-

decolonisation, the contours of the

to self-determination under international

law became more uncertain. It is
decolonisation context,

the

applies equally in the non

it is uncertain whether non-colonial

peoples have

to

their mother

or if such non-colonial

self-de termi

nation, to claim independence through remedial secession.
peoples have claimed
secession;

right to

recognised
norm ofterritorial

leading to ""''""·""secession, this would

State. This tension in
States

group

Court

(IC])

not pro-

subject in its 2010 Advisory Opinion regarding the inde
pendence of Kosovo.

unsolvable, in

ofuncertainty regarding the right to self-determination

secession. One

a

flict is N agorno-Karabakh, a small
Azerbaijan,

which has been occupied

the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh
2

Antonio Cassese, Self-Determination

con
of

Armenia since

will conclude

the people of
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interna
Because
an express
secede, the

ofNagorno-Karabakh are only entitled to exercise <Pllr-fi,prprr11iiuauuu

rights internally, within
Karabakh may

able

if they can establish

mother State

to

people of Nagorno

argue that they have a
it would not

internal self-determination

possible for them
Azerbaijan. In

would have to

to

meaningfully exercise

instance, the

of

with Azerbaijan about

for self-determination, which may include secession, like in the Kosovo case. Presently,
people

the right to

Nagorno-Karabakh is a mountainous region in the Caucasus which had, for
a transit zone for different

groups. Over

centuries,

and the Otto

different empires dashed for control over this
man

many
groups. For example,

\Vhole Caucasus
Armenians.

means of a policy

In 1920, the Russian

Soviet leadership decided to

Christianization

Anny invaded

of

Caucasus and

Nagorno-Karabakh under Azeri

1921, the
5

Nagorno-

Karabakh was purposely placed within the new Soviet Republic ofAzerbaijan,
Armenian
tween the Azeris and

' Ibid.

Armenians.

and thus positioned as a "sore

84
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Stalin knew that
including the
and
then majority 1u11uc111d11--1J<,•1Juc1aLcu
wholly within the boundaries of the new Soviet
forever remain a sore spot between the two republics that would ensure l'vfoscow' s
as power broker. 6

was relatively ..,,,.,,,,,,,,

the Soviet era, but

Hared up in

the late 1980s, when, in light
region, Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh demanded
7

nia. Azerbaijan

thousands

to flee

of ongoing violence. In

region as a

Anne

refugees, Armenian
Supreme Court of Ar

menia proclaimed the unification ofNagorno-Karabakh andArmenia. 8 By the
of 1991,

as Soviet troops joined in the fighting

already involved Azeri and Armenian

collapse of the Soviet Union,

After

N ago mo-Karabakh

rity

Cooperation in

in Europe),

in particular,

CSCE member States.

(now the Organisation for Security and Cooperation
so-called

Group" countries, a

Unfortunately, little progress has been
ment.

Minsk Group

has refused to

peace talks

as a

Azerbaijan considers the

not an independent State actor. Armenia
in

of

10

""""v' 

to any

as part of its own
insisted

it had not

any role

independence and that the regional

a Solution -A United States Institute of Peace

l.

8

Ibid.

9

Ibid.

10

Ibid The Minsk

the

France,
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con tin-

any
from N agorno-Karabakh and the surrounding Azeri
is

the

insists that its territorial integrity must be
Nagorno-Karabakh

omy,

and

continue to exist, with a significant degree

the Azeri mother State. Overall, an estimated 25,000 individuals, Arrne

nian and Azeri, have perished as a
bakh,

of

ongoing

in Nagorno-Kara

approximately 350,000 Armenians and almost

displaced. 13 In

Azeris have

erupted again in N agorno-Karabakh, resulting in

four

between Armenian and Azeri forces

""""""""0.h

As of today, the status

certain,

in 200 human

remains disputed

un

at anytime.

III. International Law on Secession

In order to assess

legal issue of whether N agorno-Karabakh

secede from Azerbaijan, this section

examine

most

the right

to

international law

doctrines, including the norms of territorial integrity and

of will shed light on this difficult situation.

11

Ibid. It should be noted that the Minsk Group countries have insisted that the

to

shouldne
and that in the absence of such an aweement, the Minsk Group countries are un
one solution over another.Ibid., 231.

12

Ibid., 216.

13

Ibid.
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and Uti Possidetis

international law norm of territorial integrity protects the territorial existence
of States. It is a

component of State sovereignty and a fundamental norm of the

international legal
Nations (UN Charter)

is embedded in
15

of

•

the territorial integrity or political independence

functioned as a shield,

may have been.

actors, and shielding
at border alteration.

principle of territorial

a norm of
derogated from. 17 Azer

customary
principle of territorial

continuously

to justify

its claim to N agorno-Karabakh - that N agorno-Karabakh belonged to Azerbaijan
are illegal under

any
disrupt Azeri territory.

ciple of international law,
that the territorial borders

of

vo.uuu:ris provides

various units were established during

times,

ing to
frontiers ..." 18
for terri
tion

to

15

Charter of the United Nations,

16

Article 2

17
18

1945, UNCIO 15, 335

UN Charter.

4), 225.
ICJ, C1se

cember 1986,

,rm1nnm

Faso v. RepublicofMali),Judgment of22De
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survive, to develop and gradually to consolidate their independence in all fields." 19 Uti
an

same
may protect unfair or unreasonable boundaries, in order

ary - thus,

by

to

States.

An uncertainty persists whether
only, or if

principle can be applied in non-decolonisation secessionist

resulting in the creation of new State entities. The
Case (Burkina Faso v.

discussed

quoted

in the

The world court's

issue
the
nected to
is no

phenomenon of obtaining ofindependence. 20
that the obligation to respect

succession derives

frontiers in the event of State
whether or not

a general

in the formula uti possidetis."

is

ICJ

21

,,.. ~~,,,.,,, outside ofthe decolonisation context unresolved, the L>a.u.L""'·'
Commission, in the context of the dissolution

the former Yugoslavia,

intra-State status to that ofinternational boundaries.
by some as not consistent \Vi th international law. Hurst Hanuum observed that" [t] his
is

19

20

if it

Ibid., para. 26.

Anne Peters, The FnnnnlP
Walter etal.
1). 110-111.

How Relevant is it for Issues of Secession?, in:

No. 3, 31 International Legal Mate
"'"v'"""' Europe: Old \\7inein New Bottles, Transna

57. 66.

88
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Commission's
Badinter Commission "was entitled

to

develop

di

rection which was already ... encapsulated in the ICJ's case law."
It is

24

to analyse

gether, in order to determine their aim
Faso v. Mali case that

"obvious purpose" of uti possidetis was "to prevent the in

dependence and

of new States

"'"''"'"re'''

by

ing power."

challenging of frontiers

25

lies in its

the

the principle

aim ofsecuring

territorial boundaries at
26

when independence is

" Thus, the purpose of uti

moment

,,u,»uicii,,,

court, is to elevate
to
raising
them to
vu.nu:u:i;:,

level of new international ones as Yugoslavia was breaking

If uti
it

were to apply to secessionist ""·""'"'0,

could

secessionist conflict by its

administrative boundaries.
A newly founded state can therefore only rely on the principle ofterritorial imegrityvis--a-
vis a
if the
had belonged to its administrative area beforehand in
accordance with
uti
rule and correspondingly
at all within its national
borders after the founding of the state. 27

In other

principle

territorial

to a

State, whose borders are prior administrative delimitations within another larger
State, through

24

Peters

25

!CJ,

State's territory

111.

Case

para. 20.

Ibid., para. 23.
The

Karabakh Conflict: A Legal

42.
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because
its ~~, ., "'""
Soviet boundaries and elevating them to

status of international frontiers.

reasoning, however, may appear contrary to the
mination. The

this tension in

it held

self-determination struggles,

territorial status quo in

is

of

Burkina Faso v. Mali opinion, when
"maintenance

wisest course." ~
2

seen as

the

ICJ

held
lt]he essential requirement of stability in order to survive, to develop and gradually to
consolidate their independence in all
has induced African States judiciously to
of colonial
and to take account of it in the intPrrwPt"
consent to the
tion ofthe pull1-1pic

It appears, from reading the Burkina Faso v. Mali opinion, that the principle
in the creation ofnew
it may

to

to

section below will

preserve

self-determination, its evolution and its applicability in the

non-decolonisation context, in order to attempt to resolve
determination

tension between self-

of States.

the

B. Self-Determination

social status. It may not

to
its political, economic, and
conflict with territorial integrity

self-determination does not
entail a territorial separation
and because, even in cases where
from its mother
before

23

Case

Ibid.

para. 25.

90
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driving ideology behind Latin American decolonisa

tion, when fiwmer

sough t to

2

States.'· Thus, through

independence was gained for colonially

defined territorial units (the same

rn"·~~··h

would later be used in Africa). After World

TVilwn, applied the concept of

War I, United States' President,

nation to minorities, offering them the choice
In a 11

1918 speech to the United States
is not a mere phrase; it is an imperative
henceforth ignore at

expressing their political will, in order to
War II,
used by the Nazi regime to
United Nations Charter era,

the reunification of German nations. In the pre
, self-determination was more of a political
Covenant

ideology

was
35

Nations did not

the

mention
to

relations among nations

31

ThomasJ..1. Franck, The

national Law

92

for

Right to Democratic Governance, American Journal oflnter
46.

.32

33

on

3 ( 1909), 269, 271.

56

1918, 8671.

TVhelan, Wilsonian Sdf~determination and the Versailles Settlement, International and
Comparative Law Quarterly 43
99.
35

Selfdetermination as a Challenge to
'I 'he Case of Kosovo, German I .aw
8
57.
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in 1966 as well as through several General
l ICCPR provides that "[a]ll

have the right of
political status

and cultural development."

and freely pursue

38

1960 Dec

laration on the Granting oflndependence to Colonial Countries
in

2 that

11

provides

right to

right they freely determine their ,.,~··""~·"

to

United Nations Charter.'10

have the right to self-determination under

to self-determination

purposes ofselfdetermi-

nation,

decolonisation context, and

contours of the

the

many in the international community agree

defining the term "people" for the purposes ofself-determination is a difficult task. 41
Scholars

elaborated

criteria for

a subjective and an

element. The subjective element consists of a
members

all

a group, that they constitute a unit and that they share a common his

36

Art. 1 UN Charter.

37

International Covenant on Civil and Political

18

Art. 1 ICCPR.

30

held belief,

Declaration on the Granting to

19 December 1966, CNTS 999, 171

to Colonial Countries and

GA Res. 1514

ofl4 December 1960.
40
Declaration on
oflnternational Law 'L.v111..c11111.1ic
Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
tober 1970 (Friendly Relations .uo.1«1«wm J.

41

See, e.g:, Cr1stellino

1), 32.

Ck

92

GERMA,'<YEARBOOKOF lNTERNATJO:-;AL LAW

42

ties -

59 · 2016

i\1oreover, most agree

right to self-determination

to the

latter. Minor

defined as

ities

a group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State, in a non-dominant
whose members ofthe State - possess ethnic,
characteristics
those ofthe rest ofthe
and
a sense of solidarity, directed towards nrrw'rvm

main distinction between minorities and peoples lies in the notion that minor
within a larger mother State with a

ities

minorities may not

and

a

autonomy claim. Moreover,

viewed as "whole peoples" or an entire group within a specific

peoples are
groups

Chechens,

the same status

If one conceives
of a

as a "whole people" or an entirety of a nation, one may

questions about

the inhabitants ofNagorno-Karabakh do constitute a people.

It may be that they arc simply Armenian, or
that the citizens

or a mixture of

Nagorno-Karabakh are a people,

determination may they

kind of a

issue will be explored fully in section V. below.

Second, it is disputed whether the

to self-determination applies

It may be argued

which do not involve
ter, the

serious

the

to

cases

Nations

the two General Assembly resolutions specifically

to the

decolonisation context and would not
is the 1970

oflnterRapporteur.
and
44

Cr1stellino

the

of Persons

Minorities, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev.l

1), 33.

Ethnic, Rdi
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it on

to
interests.

Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging any
action which would dismember or
or in part, the territorial
of
and
States
themselves in
and self-determination ofpeoples as described above and
of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory
without distinction as to race, creed or colour. 45

interpreted the

Relations Declaration as not only applying to

whose governments do not act in compliance with
rights" and

of "equal
this argument upon

Declaration's overall

provisions, which mention the

a total of eight times, with

first seven mentions occur-

numerous States' concerns
to self-determination would have on

State

State practice at the time that the
Declaration was

State support for self.determination in the

decolonisation context only.

48

Finally,

Declaration were read to confer a
imply that such a

right of self-determination, this would not

would automatically become a

of international

not contain, in

a cus

it may
context. 49
Relations Declaration.
Sec, e.g:, A1ilena Sterio, T'he Right to Sdf~Dctermination under International Law: "Sclflstans",
14.
Secession and the rule of the Great Powers
;,

6

Report of the
Committee on
oflnternational Law
tions and Co-Operation among States, UN General
25th Sess., Suppl. 18, 99, 98,

Rda
Doc.

A/8018
;,s Sec Donald L. Horowitz, J\ Right to Secede?, in:
sion and SelfDetermination (2003), 50, 60.

Macedo/Allen Buchanan

Seces

601-602; Peter Af11

94
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in
part on an overall assessment of the Friendly Relations
International Covenants on

with

Social and Cultural
nation, as well as

and Political

which both bestow a right of"all

to self-determi

subsequent United Nations' declarations in

ing this right for linguistic,
century

1990s, affirm

50

or cultural groups. Moreover, scholars in the
the idea that

should

ment through meaningful choice and democratic processes.
the decolonisation as well as in the
International law's

remains what is has
within established states.
claims principally
breached. 51

norms
a
when those same norms have

In addition to

scholarly

evolving

tion for all peoples, State practice beginning in

of sclf.determina

late 20th century reflects a willing

ness on behalf of many States to entertain the possibility
In l
across
globe, in order to assess the will of various peoples to remain, or not, within a
State.

occurred in East

Scotland and have enabled peoples to have a voice in choosing
53

Separatist groups have

relied on

50

See Sterio

that

future political

right to self-determination, starting in

century, in order to provide legal
citizens

Quebec,

to

their claims.

to

12-13.
to Separatist Claims: Are Democratic Principles Rele

vant?. in: MacedoiBuchanan

21.
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context in its Kosovo

95

where it

of independence was lawful under
law, without declaring
nation.

55

Kosovar Albanians had the right to self-determi

Some scholars have attempted to

claims from
only to peoples

ones by arguing

legitimate self-determination
the right to self.determination

lay a territorial claim to a clearly pre-defined territorial unit; 56 in

however, it is

to

accurately assess

of

to rial

may
bakh,

right to self-determination would

people living in

region

only if one were to
to
decolonisation paradigm,
to

people of Nagorno-Karabakh may not be entitled

rely on
Third, it is unclear what the contours

side of the decolonisation paradigm.
through various ways: through

self-government, free association, or, in the

most extreme cases, through separation from the
a new State.

""'re, P r

State and the formation
through internal means

a
Scots
various other minority groups

in Great

54

Sterio

55

!CJ, Kosovo

13.

Oeler,
with Regard to Secession, in: Walter et al.
1 ), 54 ("There has never been any serious international support for a claim of selfdetermination
raised by a simple 'ethnic group'
Hrm territorial basis in
57

Sterio

18-19.

96
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statuses
federal
internal

its less intrusive nature and its

the

principle of territorial integrity of existing
exercised meaningfully within most contexts. The right to
which is

self.determination,

separation from

is more difficult

principles
as
self-determination
treaties address

principle of self-determination
as the

documents discussed

and the international

Relations

do not

light on how one is supposed to distinguish between internal
international

peoplcs. 59 Most

the latter is ever available to

mination and on

scholars would agree

external self-determination accrues only in

in light of

situation, the right to

most extreme instances where a people's
the mother State. 60

right to

self.determination issues
tangentially addressed these in the Kosovo Opinion.
Aaland Islands are a
den.

Finland gained

War I, Aaland Islands
ethnically

sought to separate from Finland in order to join'""''''",, This exercise
as a people, would exercise

would suggest
'

3

to

19.

Sterio

von
Self-Determination and Secession in Interna
and Trends with Particular Focus on the Commonwealth of Independent
l ), 2
exact contents of the
remain a
matter
who is entitled ... ls the right, due to its historical
... " "And what
does self~determination
tions of
autonomy or, as a matter oflast resort, a
Ft>r'"">rt1vP<

60

Sec_,

61

See

e.g.)
No.3,atS-10
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Finland would not
62

n1eaningfnl exercise of autonomy within

secession could

Con1mission suggested

available as a "last resort when the State lacks either

or the

effective guarantees" for minority group rights. 63

power to enact
A similar view was

by the Supreme Court of Canada, in the

64

Quebec case. The

of Canada had, throughout

20th century,

second

These demands culmi
Quebecois were asked to express their view
State

its "'"-n"·"''
existing state" and
cases" and "potentially tak[ing]
secession." 65 The Court
"being totally frustrated" internally,

as arising "in only the most extreme

form

assertion of a right to unilateral

when a people's
people may

entitled to exercise external

The Aaland Islands Question:
Commission of Rapporteurs, LN Doc.
63

Ibid.

64

Supreme Court of Canada, Ke1·erenrere Seression

65

I bid., para. 126.

66

Ibid., para. 135.

to self-determination is

ofNations

20

l ')':)8, 2 S.C. Res. 217.

the

98
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mother State, and only in the most extreme circumstances and cases may a people
claim the right to
cluded that

self-determination. The Canadian

Court con

Quebecois people in Canada

internal

determination rights, and the Court thus

to

elaborate on circumstances

possibility of external self-determination. Thus, the

which would lead toward
Commission

while

Court, like the Aaland Islands Commission, reaffirmed the
stats over any notions of
most extreme circum-·

A similar view of
and perhaps more

plications of the right to self-determination"
"nmst not
In
of

frontiers at the time of independence.
was

Kosovar

to selfdetermination

to

issue an

on

of Independence under international law.7 1 The more

specific circumstances of the Kosovo Case

analysed below,
on

to

en

for the purposes
may accrue.

Ibid., para. 130.
68

Ibid., para. 131.

6

Sterio

'

Arbitration, Commission Opinion No. 2, 31LL.M.1497
71

ICJ. Kosouo

FROZEN CO~FLICTS: NAGOR~O-KARABAKH
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pertains to its most extreme,

regarding
secession from

mother

following section will discuss the

right to secession under

C. Remedial Secession

If a people exercises its
to external self-determination, this entails a separation
mother State through secession. Because secession seems inherently at odds

from

with the norms of territorial integrity and

it is understandable

many

in the international community view secession with suspicion. A1arc
"[t]he

to

unilateral secession stands in obvious tension with the

claim to territorial integrity and unity of existing states." 73 The principle of territorial
integrity is a ius cogens norm of international

allowing no derogations. 71 Coupled

with the principle of
respect pre-existing international
"The Court is not
national law conferred a

the
is has been asked to take
entitlement on Kosovo
to

its

or. a

on whether international law generally confers an entitlement on entities situated within a State
break away from it." Ibid., para. 56. It should be noted, however, that one of the dissent
exriressen a dear view that international law does not confer the right to
outside of the decolonisation context. "To
other
uu;~u"'"' or
group to declare independence and break
the
it forms part, outside the context of decolonization, creates a very
Kosovo
Koroma, para. 4.

as "a norm
and
the international
which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified
international law
same character".

a subse

100 GERMA,'<YEARBOOKOF lNTERNATJO:-;AL LAW 59 · 2016

of Statehood by
which

international community.

force to attain defacto

include Northern Cyprus,

from Cyprus, Southern

which

unilaterally declared

Transnitria. 77 "In

Sou th Ossetia and Abkhazia, Chechnya,
lawful secession,
attempted to

government of

such instances of un
which these entities

right to forcefully

the renegade

docs not contain a
ofsecession, but that it tolerates secession, as an exercise ofexternal
in the most extreme instances where the mother State is not representative
seceding people

the

of oppression toward

seceding people.

secession may be

in interna

This

Some

circumstances. Antonio Cassese

But see Peters
114-115
that the
while applicable in
the decolonisation context, does not automatically apply to all secessions and that
does not
the same time as the
of sdf~determination, because
"refers to a rule for the
identification ofboundaries following the proclamation
existence of a
76

Strrio

carnc into existence
78
79
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lw]hen the central authorities ofa sovereign state
or racial group,

and

In addition to the Friendly

101

to grant participatory
upon their funda
settlemen t within the frame-·

the 1993 Vienna

World

thus secession, in instances where
and self-determination. Two subsequent United
measure of protection
group

been consistently

82

a

In addition, the African Commission on

Canadian Supreme Court in the Quebec

Human Rights, similarly to

rights to

seeking external self
discrimination from

that

the absence of concrete evidence of violations of human rights to the
that the
territorial
should be called to
and in the absence ofevidence that
the
ofKatanga are denied the right to participate in Government ... the Commis
sion holds the view that
is
to exercise a variant of selfdetermination that
is
with the
and territorial
ofZaire

81
Vienna Declaration and Programme ofAction, \Vorld Conference on Human
A/CONF.157/23
2 (Vienna
It should be noted that the
tion, unlike the
Declaration, did not limit the list of
to those
distinctions
on other i-,rrounds, such as rdi
right to external selfdetermination.
82
Commission on Human Rights: Sub-commission on Prevention and Protection of.l'vfinorities,
Protection of Minorities: Possible
and Means of
the Peaceful and Constructive
Solution of Problems
UN Doc. E/CN
(
84; Report
ofthe Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, GAOR Slst Sess.,
No. 18, 125
126. para. 11, CN Doc. A/51 /18
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determination,

In
secession may

accepted in instances

defined group or people is placed in danger by

a
mother State. Thomas Burri
most

He
has

in case of massive and

mother State should face

"ultimate punishment:

violations of human rights, the
loss ofsovereignty over

Geter
If a state completely blocks any 'internal self-determination', erodes existing arrangements
and takes recourse to brutal forms of violent
ending in gross and
consistent patterns of crimes against humanity, forms of 'ethnic cleansing', and
even genocide, a
to secession' as an emergency tool seems to be arguable. 85

Burri

sions may have a

to

Geter

seces

out

cause only in the most extreme instances, and that

any proposed or accomplished secession should
peaceful negotiations.

out through

86

above-discussed norms of territorial integrity and

as the

minority groups on
and

serves as an

excellent comparison to the Nagorno-Karabakh case. Section IV. below

84

et al.

'J'homas Burri) Secession in the C:IS: c:auses,

l ). 145.

85

Oeter

57.

86

Burri

154; Oeter

64.

and

discuss

in: Walter

FROZEN Co~FLICTS: NAGOR;'-JO-KARABAKH

103

Section V.
as

as

The Kosovo Case
argued that some secession cases, including

Geter

cases

bad law."

87

are "hard

Geter argues that even if one

of

secession as a

a

few other cases
sion, as instances of an
Kosovar Albanians did not have a good argument for secession,

their case was

circumstances, such as

too
88

munity's ongoing

Kosovo case will

Kosovo may be "bad" precedent for secession legally

examined in more detail below.
site

Kosovo is a
when

dom until
invaded by the Ottoman Empire.
Kosovo was
a

of Serbia. After the
""'"'""v~in

of

independence

was

Ottoman Empire in 19
91

by

ofYugoslavia (SFRY) was
and

com

Republic

1945, Kosovo became an autonomous region
Constitution
Kosovo

acquired its own constitution, government, legislature, judiciary, police and bank. 93

87

Geter (note

83

Ibid., 60.

59.

89

For example, Russia recognised the uc:•Jrnta11
as independent, citing the Kosovo secession
the Russian Federation,
2008;
Doc. S/PV.5969 8
90

James Surmners, Kosovo, in: Walter

01

Ibid.

92

Ibid.

03

Ibid., 237.

regions of South Ossetia and Abkahzia
Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
President of Russia Dimitry Medvedev, UN

uLC:a":"w:±v

1), 236.
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After the death of Yugoslav leader

federal structure,

participate in the
ineffective.

94

Broz Tito in

Under

Kosovo continued to

system proved to be weak

leadership

in the late 1980s,

Serbia sought to dominate the
the

1990s,

by

not autonomous provinces, Kosovo was denied recognition. 97 During
1990s, conflict erupted in Kosovo as

Albanians increasingly demanded

independence from Serbia and aslvlilosevic continued to engage in brutal repression. 98
In

NATO countries

in a

long series

in
Kosovo.

99

tactics in

The air campaign ended with the signing

and a Peace Agreement in

air

1999.

100

so-called Rambouillet

On 10 June

the Security

Council passed resolution 1244 which laid out the framework for the international
administration of
substantial

which involved an international security presence
Nations and NATO

Kosovar's
Kosovo was

91

Ibid.

95

Ibid., 237-238.

96

Ibid., 237
referendum, where 99.87% of voters endorsed
at 87.01 % of the total population

90

mu1qJ<:uuc:rnx;

See Arbitration Commission of the Peace Conference on
para. I.

No. 2. 31 I.LM.

1498 (
98

Sterio

99

Ibid., 119.

100

118-119.

Ibid.

Sec, e.g., Enver Hasani, Sdf~Dctcrmination Under thcT'crms ofthc 2002 Union
ween Serbiaand!Vfontenegro: Tracing the
ofKosovo's SelfDetermination,
Review 80
305-323.
101

102

Hasani

323-325.

Bct
«<ecn"""

Law

105
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Kosovo,

status

and
issue.

nations,
Kosovo's independence and it requested, through a General
Assembly

the ICJ to issue an

ti on of Independence violated international

about
!0'1

Kosovar
Court held in a 10-4 vote

it did not, but
of secession under

not specify whether a
in the Kosovo case, secession would be tolerated because it was accomplished
non-State actors

was not contrary to

The court

States generally

principle

integrity. 107

on the existence of the right

to

remedial secession and thus refused to issue a
The Kosovo case is difficult because it represents
in

Kosovo as an
is

countries, in
'''·"hc'"''~.

109

Sterio

104

Surmners

105

Ibid.

106

Ibid., 246.

Kosovo

Is it because Kosovar Albanians have a nnc,,··•vP right to external

LLLLLL~""LL leading to

103

consensus among
remedial secession, or is it because Kosovo is

119.

244.

Ibid., 250; see also
a
right to
self~
determination was "a subject on which radically different views were expressed by those taking part in
the pi C>UC<CUlll;(>
103
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Kosovar Albanians did not establish

secessionist threshold. First, at the time

independence was

'"'"'rM'"'" and

over eight years.
its political
present.

112

and

been internation

changed its

oppression justifying "just cause" secession was no longer

Third, abuses suffered

legitimacy of

111

minority groups in Kosovo may undermine the

Albanian

and could

separatist

those non-Albanian minorities. 113 These arguments would
of recognising

Kosovar

in favour

had a right to

self:determination had not

that their right to

~"·'~u.icu

secession in 2008.
Does the Kosovo

discuss the case ofNagorno-Karabakh,
discussed international

principles

in light

of above-

Kosovo case.

v.
of the

analysis of the

under interna

does Nagorno-Karabakh

from Azerbaijan? Be

110
2008 that the Kosovo
case
not create
for
unusual combination of factors found in the Kosovo situation  including the context
the
cleansing and crimes against civilians in Kosovo, and the extenclel1
case. Kosovo cannot
- are not found elsewhere and therefore make Kosovo
for
United States
2008, available

on

253; Sterio
112

Ibid.

122; Oeter

60.

107
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and to develop a
then the people ofNagorno-Kara

ofsecession, as some
bakh would be able

to

rely on

to

separate

and

establish an independent State.
First, in light of

it may be concluded that international law tolerates

secession, but does not bestow a
'l "his view is supported

of secession on any particular groups.

a strict

which

of the Friendly

in

confirms

decolonisation context, as well as by the work of most scholars in international law,
instead propose
context

as

solution. Prominent international law scholars such

Craw-

Borgen have concluded

docs not contain a positive right
sarne,

acknowledged

even

of secession,

have written about it in terms of a "privilege" rather than a "right," arising only in very
narrow circumstanccs. 114

supported by

Kosovo Case, as the world court
114

See,

to

pronounce itself on any

State Practice and International Law in Relation to lJ nilateral Seces

is a privilege of secession
in international law
Kosovo's Declaration oflndependcncc: Sclf~Dctcrmination, Secession and
Recognition, ASIL Insights, 29 February 2008, available at:
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cession. International law may tolerate secession in
Kosovo case,
allum:vu

instances, like in

circumstances or simply because secession is a fait

of

with no possibility ofgoing back to the

State's

existing ter

ritorial borders. Moreover, the

interna

does not prohibit, allow, or regulate secession, -.,0,,........ "'"
are non-State actors. m

of ""·''-'''-''"'-"'-'-• "·'""""'

in
in

In

conclusion -

international law

not

ofsecession - it may be concluded that N agorno-Karabakh
secede from Azerbaijan. International law contains firmly established norms
sovereignty

territorial integrity.
provide that

N agorno-Karabakh

disruption only with Azerbaijan's consent,
was, at

time

Azerbaijan's

a unit within the new Azeri State."

secession of the Azerbaijan SSR from

Soviet Union, these borders were con

uti possidetis principle, into

international borders of the

including N agorno-Karabakh." 117 It should

noted

Armenia has consistently questioned the application of
situation, but

to
Ar

in

menia would have to demonstrate that N agorno-Karabakh belonged to Armenia before
foundation of the Soviet Union and

115

actors, and since no other nt<··rn•>tirm
Christian TVr1/ter, The Kosovo
et11l.
1),25.
116

Ibid., 23-24.

117

226.

118

226.

this

should matter

118

principle of territorial
is not
to non-state
legal norms are applicable to
case. internationallaw is silent."
Opinion: \vhat It
and \vhat It Does Not
in: \valter
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is tenuous at best, and is inconsistent with the

109

uti possidetis

Soviet Union and of
international
boundaries. The application of

favours the elevation

which included N agorno-Karabakh, to the status
protected frontiers.

the international community should simply
case of N agorno-Karabakh, it
appears that this entity is

from independent - it

military forces, and its own government is

been

by Armenian

dependent on Armenian support. 120

Thus, unlike Kosovo which had

Nagorno-Karabakh
not be

the larger Azeri State.
the
internal

but it is possible
in the

could

and could still be

a negotiation process with Azerbaijan.
secession exists,
only,

of

this

people ofNagorno-Karabakh

in

future, through

no international

exercised within the territory of the larger Azeri
have the right to internal
and

in the Azeri State.

a
119

Ibid., 227.

120

Ibid., 228.

to

the right to self-determination
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not

status

to secession is a
secession
into a norm ofinternational law, it is

as Cassese
under circumstances of extreme

may

mother States. Cassese has proposed a threshold of secession as "[e]xtreme

unre
"121

and

a
eignty for the mother State, if it abuses a

rights in a widespread and

larly heinous manner. 122 Two States submitting statements to
case have

in

Kosovo

laid out conditions for a possible exercise of remedial secession.

and Germany have argued that a group may claim the

to remedial secession if

two
con-

been reached in

Nagorno-Karabakh case. The

secession and

case for Nagorno-Karabakh's

becomes stronger under

paradigm.

it

violations have occurred in Nagorno-Karabakh, and
it is doubtful that its citizens could accomplish meaningful internal self-determination
within

of the

authoritarian regime and unwillingness to
the only option for
and

the region
son to
time

Koso var

had become so
121

C"assese (note

available at:

120.
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A

conceive ofKosovo as

111

situation exists in

dial secession ought to exist in
tions
to

Kosovo and Nagorno-Karabakh
on this right in order to justify their legal claim to secession from

States. As

above, however, international

right ofsecession,
may

argument

todav does not
directly

a right to remedial secession - may

at

a positive

 that nrnnrr•ccr•

a developing principle ofinter-

Third, does the Kosovo case shed light on the situation in N agorno-Karabakh? As
the nrr,,m,nc

a

Many

States in the international community'""".,,,,,.,,,,
Kosovo as a new independent nation. Other States
ICJ, upon being requested to issue an
issuing a narrow

opinion on

ruling on the issue ofthe lcgali ty

declaration ofindependence itself, not the Kosovar Albanians' right to self-determina
tion

secession. It may be argued

the

secession is

concern about secession, and its willingness to tolerate
secessions,

perhaps those

can be accomplished through

Kosovo case can also be

because of the unique circumstances

region, such as extensive international community
involvement,

United Nations

of Kosovar Albanians, as

a history

Section IV. Or, as Geter has argued, Kosovo may be
not create new bad law,

means. The

a

ofsecession.

as a hard case
124

in
should

The Kosovo case, although
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on secession issues,

not

a

secessionist movement in

as

VI. Conclusion

International law on the right
everyone in

international community agrees that colonial peoples are

entitled to self-determination and
is uncertain

on secession is

to

formation of their own independent

it

non-colonial peoples possess the same right. It may be argued

that most scholars would agree that non-colonial peoples have

right to internal

tive, according to some scholars, or affirmative,
sion, according to a
In
not have

of the above, it may

do

right to

not contain a positive norm on secession. Assuming
arc a people, theywould

the

the people ofNagorno-Karabakh could exercise
vis-a-vis

if N agorno-Karabakh were able, through a peaceful process, to
secession from Azerbaijan, uia the vehicle of external self-determination;

international would tolerate this result, like in the Kosovo case.
on the

international

ofNagorno-Karabakh the positive right to

State.
Azerbaijan in order to
attempt to

claim a
a proposed
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113

secession

secession as illegal under
meaningful
Nagorno-Karabakh, on

between all the

for

and
and perhaps secession,

flict in Nagorno-Karabakh may persist in the near future.

con

